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Political trust matters for citizens’ policy preferences but existing research has not yet 
considered whether this effect depends on how policies are designed. To fill this gap, this article 
analyses whether and how policy design and political trust interact in shaping people’s policy 
preferences. We theorise that policy controls such as limits and conditions can function as safeguards 
against uncertainty, thereby compensating for a person's lack of trust in political institutions in 
generating support for policy provision. Focusing on the case of public preferences for asylum and 
refugee policy, our empirical analysis is based on an original conjoint experiment with 12,000 
respondents across eight European countries. Our results show that individuals’ trust in the political 
institutions of the European Union has a central role in the formation of their asylum and refugee policy 
preferences. Individuals with lower levels of political trust in European institutions are less supportive 
of asylum and refugee policies that provide expansive, unlimited, or unconditional protection and more 
supportive of policies with highly restrictive features. We also demonstrate that even politically 
distrusting individuals can systematically support policies that provide protection and assistance to 
refugees if there are limits or conditions on policy provision. We conclude by discussing the relevance 
of our findings to theoretical understandings of the role of political trust in the formation of individuals’ 
policy preferences. 
Keywords 
Political trust, policy preferences, asylum and refugee policy. 
  1 
Introduction* 
The trust people have in political institutions is an important ingredient in the formation of their 
preferences on a wide range of public policy issues. Political trust affects individuals’ policy preferences 
by functioning as a means for assessing the performance of governing institutions. Through this 
function, the degree of people’s political trust influences the extent of government action they support. 
This is particularly important for policies that mostly benefit political minorities as previous research 
has shown (Hetherington 2005; Rudolph and Evans 2005; Paxton and Knack 2011; Popp and Rudolph 
2011).  
Yet, the current academic understanding of how political trust conditions policy preference formation 
is still rather limited and incomplete, as Citrin and Stoker (2018) remark in their recent review essay. 
While previous research has demonstrated that political trust matters for policy preferences (see Rudolph 
2017 for an overview), we argue that it is limited by its dichotomous conception of public preferences 
(i.e. ‘supporting’ vs. ‘opposing’ a policy). This dichotomous approach does not sufficiently reflect the 
complexity of individuals’ preferences as it ignores the possible role of policy design.  
Policy design has been shown to have its own separate influence on policy preferences (Bechtel et 
al. 2017, Ackert et al. 2007), so it is important to explore the potential interactions between policy design 
and political trust. The current literature on the role of political trust in shaping individuals’ policy 
preferences implies that widespread citizen distrust hinders the government from pursuing liberal 
policies of government spending and protection (Citrin and Stoker 2018). This line of reasoning fails to 
consider how particular policy design features could possibly mitigate the conditional effect of low trust 
on policy preferences. 
The aim of this study is to examine whether and how policy design and political trust interact in 
shaping policy preferences. We theorise that policy controls such as limits and conditions can provide 
safeguards which can mitigate a person's lack of trust in political institutions in their preference 
formation. Distrusting individuals, according to our theoretical framework, can nevertheless provide 
support for policy areas that require sacrifice and are not directly beneficial to them, if certain 
safeguards, namely policy limits and conditions, are in place.  
We test this framework empirically by studying public preferences for asylum and refugee policy in 
a cross-national experimental setting. There are several reasons why asylum and refugee policy is a 
particularly suitable policy area for our analysis. Political trust is likely to play an especially important 
role for certain types of policies. It is particularly pertinent to policies under which the majority of 
citizens have almost no first-hand experience, receive few tangible benefits but incur real or perceived 
costs (Hetherington 2005). Asylum and refugee policies are good examples of such policies. Moreover, 
the specific nature of asylum-seeking and refugee protection, in particular the complexity of the policy 
processes and the volatility of migrant arrivals, makes citizens’ confidence in the functioning of political 
institutions especially pertinent.  
                                                     
* This study has been funded by the Mercator Foundation as part of the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration 
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Dinas, Dominik Hangartner, Marc Helbling, and Yvonni Markaki. We are also grateful to Jennifer Roberton and Sebastian 
Kramer of Respondi for the careful implementation of the survey as well as the numerous individuals who provided 
feedback during the pre-testing phase.  
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This article makes several contributions. First, we propose a new theoretical framework to explain 
how policy design can mitigate the role of low political trust in conditioning public policy preferences. 
Second, we build on earlier observational approaches and analyse the relationship between political trust 
and policy preferences in an experimental setting for the first time. Our conjoint methodology allows us 
to demonstrate empirically how certain policy instruments enable distrusting individuals to nevertheless 
generate support for policy areas that are not directly materially beneficial to them. Our results thus 
imply that political trust does not simply have a binary effect on policy preferences. Contrary to the way 
it has been mostly understood until now (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Globietti 2002), the 
impact of political trust critically depends on the design features of the policies. We show that specific 
policy design features such as limits and conditions are able to mitigate perceived risk and uncertainty 
which we expect to be crucial for individuals who are less trusting in political institutions.  
Political Trust, Policy Preferences and the Role of Policy Design 
Hetherington’s (2005) theory of political trust helps us understand when political trust is relevant in 
preference formation – in other words, why and how it is important in some policy areas and not in 
others. According to Hetherington, political trust plays an important role in preference formation when 
a policy involves sacrifice and risk (p. 6), and when it concentrates its “benefits on a minority while 
imposing the real or perceived costs on a political majority” (Hetherington 2005, pg. 106). In other 
words, trust can be expected to matter most when the majority is asked to make a sacrifice without 
receiving tangible benefits in return.  
Political trust can affect individuals’ policy preferences by offering a way of coping with the 
complexities of the world today “by structuring views about specific (…) policies according to their 
more general and abstract beliefs” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, p. 1114). In particular, when it comes to 
highly complex policy issues, individuals are likely to rely on cognitive simplification strategies that 
minimize the time and cognitive effort in the formation of their judgements. In such cases, political trust 
functions as a heuristic device, or mental shortcut, that allows people to expend less effort in gathering 
information for their decision making. This would mean that individuals who have little (or a lot of) 
confidence in political institutions are using their negative (or positive) evaluations as a heuristic in the 
formation of their policy preferences. Therefore, individuals who are distrusting of their government’s 
institutions are inclined to restrict the scope of the state’s activities and spending (Hetherington 2005) 
while more trusting individuals are more open to cooperate or support government initiatives (also see 
Putnam 2000; Putnam 1993). A lack of trust in an institution also makes people less willing to accept 
its decisions in general (Tyler and Degoey 1996).  
However, this current understanding of how political trust affects public support for government 
policies is limited by its consideration of public preferences in terms of binary policy choices. It suggests 
that political trust determines whether individuals support or oppose government activity in a certain 
policy area at all. Hetherington (2005: 139) argues that “when the public does not trust that the 
government will implement the policies efficiently or fairly, people will prefer that the government not 
be involved.” This binary approach obscures a more nuanced role that political trust can play in the 
formation of policy preferences. Individuals not only decide whether they support policy provision or 
not, but they are also influenced by the specific design of the policy. Our aim is to go beyond 
Hetherington’s theory by considering the role of political trust in the formation of policy preferences 
involving non-binary policy choices and, more specifically, by theorizing how certain policy designs 
can encourage individuals who are distrusting of political institutions to nevertheless be supportive of 
policies that require sacrifice but for which they do not receive tangible benefits.  
So, what policy features might allow distrusting individuals to form supportive policy preferences? 
We know from existing research that, in addition to acting as a heuristic that helps reduce complexity, 
trust is an important resource for coping with uncertainty (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2014; Kollock 1994; 
Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998) which is also relevant to policy preference formation. We argue 
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that certain policy instruments can offer an alternative mechanism for mitigating uncertainty amongst 
individuals who lack trust in political institutions. A sense of distrust tends to accompany “a course of 
action based on suspicion, monitoring, and activation of institutional safeguards” (Lewis and Weigart 
1985, pp. 969). We reason that distrusting individuals can support more expansive government policies 
if they employ explicit means of control. Such means of policy control can function as safeguards against 
uncertainty, compensating for a person's lack of trust in political institutions during preference 
formation. We identify two potential instruments of policy control: limits, which ration the policy 
provision and conditions, which regulate the policy’s effective provision according to well-defined rules 
(see Spicker 2015).1  
Based on the idea that policy controls can act as safeguards against uncertainty, we reason further 
that the use of limits and conditions carries a greater importance in preference formation of distrusting 
individuals relative to more trusting individuals. This is because, if they are to support some form of 
policy provision, low trusting individuals have a greater need to rely on policy safeguards to compensate 
for the perceived uncertainty generated by their lack of political trust. In other words, we expect that the 
difference between the extent of individuals’ support for policies that feature limits and conditions, and 
their support for policies with unconditional or unlimited features, will be accentuated for individuals 
who are less political trusting.  
Empirical Approach: Public Preferences for Asylum and Refugee Policy 
Asylum and refugee policies are a clear example of policies that benefit a political minority in the host 
country (i.e. non-citizens seeking protection) while requiring the majority of citizens to make a sacrifice 
in the sense that these policies do not generate immediate and tangible material benefits for them. While 
refugees and asylum-seekers remain a relatively minor component of immigration in wealthy 
democracies, they are nonetheless disproportionately present in the public’s perception of who 
immigrants are (Blinder, 2015; Blinder & Jeannet, 2017) and the policy issue has become perceived as 
rife with uncertainty, particularly after the global refugee ‘crisis’ in 2015-6.  
We implemented an original choice-based conjoint survey experiment to examine if the relationship 
between political trust and policy preferences for asylum and refugee policy is contingent upon how 
policy is designed. In our conjoint experiment, respondents were shown pairs of randomly generated 
policies and asked which of the two policies they would prefer their country to adopt. This randomized 
design allows researchers to isolate the separate causal effects of particular policy features in garnering 
public support (see Hainmueller et al. 2015). 
A conjoint experiment has some notable advantages over observational survey designs which makes 
it well-suited for this study. Most importantly, it allows us to assess the influence of policy design 
features on people’s support for asylum and refugee policy, and how this varies across individuals who 
differ in their extent of political trust. Unlike previous research on political trust and policy preferences 
which is predominantly observational, the conjoint design helps us to minimize the possibility of social 
desirability bias which is crucial in policy areas that are strongly subject to ethical and humanitarian 
considerations. It does so by minimizing the likelihood that respondents provide a response they believe 
to be politically correct or ‘expected’ by the researchers, since the different policy options vary across 
several dimensions (Hainmueller et al. 2015). 
Our analysis focuses on Europe, a continent at the epicentre of the global refugee ‘crisis’ in 2015-
16. Our survey experiment was conducted online in May 2019 across eight European countries: Austria, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden. The total sample size was 12,000 adults, 
                                                     
1 Both limits and conditions, can also be used to reign in the extent of financial spending in a policy area. 
Anne-Marie Jeannet, Esther Ademmer, Martin Ruhs, Tobias Stöhr 
4 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
comprising a nationally representative sample of 1,500 in each country.2 Respondents first read the 
instructions of the survey and were then shown an introductory page that briefly explained the key terms 
used in the experiment (such as ‘asylum-seeker’, ‘refugee’, and ‘resettlement’).3 Each respondent was 
asked to make five binary policy comparisons, meaning that after completing the survey each respondent 
had considered and assessed ten randomly generated policies. All asylum and refugee policies shown to 
respondents included six policy dimensions, with two to three possible policy features selected randomly 
within each dimension. For each asylum and refugee policy that a respondent considered, we constructed 
a variable policy_support, and coded it 1 if an individual chose this policy and 0 if it was not chosen.4 
After completing the five conjoint tasks, the survey asked respondents a series of questions about their 
age, gender, education, political orientation, preferred scale of immigration, and political trust.5 
Table 1 shows the randomly allocated policy features for each of the dimensions of asylum and 
refugee policy. We identify six core dimensions of asylum and refugee policy, drawing on recent 
research (Jeannet et al, 2019). These relate to: the right to apply for asylum; the resettlement of 
recognized refugees; the return of asylum seekers whose applications for protection have been 
unsuccessful to countries where they might face harm; the right to family reunification for recognized 
refugees; and the provision of financial assistance to first countries of asylum, i.e. lower-income 
countries outside Europe that host large numbers of refugees near conflict regions. As shown in Table 
1, within each dimension, we randomize policy design features that include or exclude limits or 
conditions. Finally, in order to validate our measures of political trust (we measure both EU and national 
political trust as further described below), we also include a dimension that randomizes decision-making 
over asylum applications between the European Union and national governments.  
An example of a conjoint task as it appeared in our survey can be found in Appendix 5. The order in 
which the dimensions were listed was randomized for each respondent. 
 
  
                                                     
2 The survey company that implemented the experiment, Respondi, uses matched sampling procedures which has been 
shown to be a highly accurate technique for approximating a random sample (see Ansolabehere and Schnaffer 2013). 
3 The text of this introduction can be found in Appendix 1. To be sure that these definitions did not prime the respondents 
conjoint tasks, a group of respondents (n=1015) was not shown this introduction page. To rule out a priming effect, we do 
not find significant differences between the preferences of individuals who were shown this introductory page and 
individuals who were not.  
4 After choosing one of two policies, respondents were asked to rank each policy on a scale from 1 to 7. We have used these 
ratings as a robustness check for our dependent variable measurement (available upon request). It also allows us to validate 
the measurement of policy choice as well as identify individuals who were inattentive (e.g. because they gave inconsistent 
answers) and whose choices may thus decrease data quality.  
5 The precise wording of all these questions can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Table 1. Experimental policy features, by six policy dimensions of asylum and refugee policy 
We used two survey items to measure a person’s political trust.6 Given the multi-level governance of 
asylum and refugee issues in the European Union, we measure both trust in EU institutions and national 
government institutions.7 EU trust and national political trust are conceptually distinct (see DeVries 
2018) and we expect both to matter in the formation of Europeans’ asylum and refugee policy 
preferences. While national political institutions govern many dimensions of asylum and refugee policy, 
asylum and refugee policy is widely perceived as a European issue due to the way it has been framed in 
public discourse (d’Haenens and Lange 2001, Horsti 2007; Slominski and Trauner 2018). For these 
reasons, we expect political trust in European institutions to play a particularly important and potentially 
dominant role.  
To analyse results of our experiment across sub-groups of respondents with different levels of 
political trust, we follow the approach by Leeper et al (forthcoming) and compute the conditional 
                                                     
6 We asked respondents the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how much you trust certain 
institutions. Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust: 1) national government institutions and 2) EU institutions.” 
Respondents were asked to choose from the following response categories: entirely trusting, somewhat trusting, a little bit 
trusting, a lit bit distrusting, somewhat distrusting, entirely distrusting. 
7 We asked respondents the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how much you trust certain 
institutions. Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust: 1) national government institutions and 2) EU institutions.” 
Respondents were asked to choose from the following response categories: entirely trusting, somewhat trusting, a little bit 
trusting, a lit bit distrusting, somewhat distrusting, entirely distrusting. 
Asylum Applications 1. Anyone can apply for asylum in [YOUR COUNTRY] 
without annual limits.  
2. Anyone can apply for asylum in [YOUR COUNTRY] until 
an annual limit is reached.  
Resettlement  1. No resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to 
[YOUR COUNTRY] 
2. Low resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to 
[YOUR COUNTRY] (1 person per 10000 citizens per year, 
i.e. [country specific population]). 
3. High resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to 
[YOUR COUNTRY] (2 or more persons per 10000 citizens 
per year, i.e. [country specific population]). 
Return to Harm 1. Refused asylum-seekers are never sent back to countries 
where they could face serious harm 
2. In some cases, refused asylum-seekers can be sent back to 
countries where they could face serious harm. 
Family Reunification  1. Recognized refugee can always bring his/her spouse and 
children 
2. Recognized refugee can bring his/her spouse and children 
only if refugee can pay for their cost of living 
3. Recognized refugee cannot bring his/her spouse and 
children 
Decision-making  1. Each EU country makes its own decisions on asylum 
applications within its territory.  
2. A centralised European Union agency decides on 
applications for asylum for all EU countries 
Financial assistance to non-
EU countries hosting 
refugees  
1. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides unconditional financial 
assistance to non-EU countries that host refugees. 
2.  [YOUR COUNTRY] provides financial assistance to non-
EU countries that host refugees only if they help reduce 
asylum seekers coming to Europe. 
3. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides no financial assistance to 
non-EU countries that host refugees. 
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marginal means.8 When computing the marginal means, we follow standard practice and apply cluster-
robust standard errors at the respondent level to correct for possible within-respondent clustering. In all 
our analyses, we use entropy-balancing survey weights to correct for sampling error. 
Experimental Results 
We find strong evidence that policy preferences for asylum and refugee policies are conditional on a 
person’s trust in EU institutions. The results are displayed in Figure A below, in the form of marginal 
means. We distinguish between six sub-groups of respondents who differ in their degrees of political 
trust in European institutions.9  
The marginal means can be interpreted as an indication how favourably a policy is viewed. In a 
forced choice design such as ours, where respondents need to choose exactly one of the two policies 
they are shown, a person randomizing their choice would select each policy feature with a probability 
of 50 percent. A marginal mean of, for example, 55 percent indicates that policies that include this 
particular feature are selected with a probability of 55 percent.  
Figure A. Marginal Means for Trust in European Political Institutions  
 
 
Note: Values of EU trust 1-6 indicate answer options “Entirely trusting” (1, bottom of the stacked bars), “Somewhat 
trusting”, “A little bit trusting”, “A little bit distrusting”, “Somewhat distrusting”, and “Entirely distrusting (6, top of the 
stacked bars)”. Results from separate estimations per sub-group. 
                                                     
8 As Leeper et al. (forthcoming) point out, marginal means allow us to compare the effects of different levels of political 
trust on individuals’ policy preferences in a more intuitive manner than other approaches.  
9 Results for all respondents without distinguishing by level of political trust are available in Appendix 6.  
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The findings in Figure A strongly support our expectation that individuals who are more distrusting tend 
to be less supportive of policies that include expansive, unlimited, and unconditional features, and more 
supportive of policies that eliminate protection/assistance in some policy dimensions. For example, in 
the asylum dimension, distrusting respondents are significantly less likely to support policies that feature 
unlimited asylum applications than the most trusting respondents (the difference in marginal means 
between the most and least trusting sub-groups of respondents is seven percentage points). Similarly, 
considering unconditional family reunification, the most distrusting people are considerably less likely 
to support policies which allow for unconditional family reunification than the most trusting people in 
our sample (the difference between the marginal means of the most and least trusting sub-groups is ten 
percentage points). The same patterns of lower support for unconditional policies amongst individuals 
with less political trust can be observed for never returning refused asylum seekers to places where they 
could face harm, unconditional financial assistance to non-EU countries hosting refugees, and high 
levels of refugee-resettlement.  
At the same time, less trusting respondents are significantly more likely than trusting persons to 
support policies that eliminate protection and assistance. As can be seen in Figure A, this holds for all 
our policy dimensions that feature the elimination of protection, rights, or assistance altogether: 
distrusting individuals are significantly more likely to support policies that do not provide any financial 
assistance to non-EU countries (difference in marginal means between least and most trusting 
respondents is 5.7 percentage points) and that do not allow for any refugee resettlement (difference in 
marginal means is 3.9 percentage points). Distrusting individuals are also considerably less likely than 
trusting individuals to oppose policies that never provide family reunification for recognized refugees 
(marginal means 51.7 and 40.1 percent, respectively).  
Our results suggest that distrusting respondents prefer policies that abandon protection to policies 
that provide protection without limits or conditions. The inverse applies to the most trusting individuals. 
For example, with regard to family reunification, the most distrusting individuals are more supportive 
of a policy that abolishes the right to family reunification than a policy that provides this right 
unconditionally (marginal means difference = 8.9 percentage points). In stark contrast, for highly 
trusting individuals, a policy which abandons family reunification is 14.2 percentage points less likely 
to be supported than a policy that allows for unconditional family reunification. A very similar pattern 
can be observed for financial assistance to non-EU countries. In the case of resettlement, distrusting 
people, unlike those individuals with high amounts of political trust, prefer policies that do not allow for 
any resettlement to policies with high levels of resettlement. 
Therefore, if we consider respondents’ preferences for policies that include ‘extreme’ policy features 
only, i.e. ‘no protection/assistance’ and ‘protection without limits and conditions’, we find support for 
Hetherington’s (2005) argument that distrusting individuals on average prefer no intervention by the 
government over government intervention. However, our analysis of the role of political trust goes 
beyond this binary understanding and also considers policy preferences when policy controls such as 
limits and conditions are employed. Our results show an important nuance and new insight, namely, that 
even distrusting individuals can support policies if they include limits or conditions.  
Figure A shows clearly that individuals with lower levels of political trust are more supportive of 
policies that provide protection and assistance to refugees if these policies utilize controls such as limits 
or conditions. This holds across all five policy dimensions that include values with features of limits or 
conditions. For example, individuals with low levels of trust show greater support for asylum and 
refugee policies that include limits on annual asylum applications (MM=0.55) than for policies that do 
not include such limits (MM=0.45). Similarly, people with low trust show considerably more support 
for asylum and refugee policies that condition family reunification on the refugee’s ability to cover the 
costs of living of their family members (MM=0.56) than for policies that facilitate family reunification 
without this condition (MM=0.43). Similar preference structures can be observed in the policy 
dimensions relating to return, financial assistance to non-EU countries hosting refugees, and refugee 
resettlement.  
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Across all policy dimensions except for the ‘return dimension’, a low level of political trust 
accentuates the relative difference between individuals’ support for asylum and refugee policies which 
feature limits and/or conditions and their support for policies which do not.10 In other words, policies 
that feature limits and conditions are more relevant to the formation of supportive policy preferences of 
low trusting individuals. For example, considering financial assistance to non-EU countries hosting 
refugees, the difference between policies that include conditions on financial assistance and 
unconditional financial assistance is much larger for people with low trust than for individuals with high 
trust. In fact, people with the highest degree of trust in our sample do not differ in their support for 
policies that provide conditional or unconditional financial assistance. The same applies to the other 
policy dimensions. As we expected, low levels of political trust amplify the positive role of limits and 
conditions in generating support for asylum and refugee policies that provide protection and assistance.  
Overall, our results support our theoretical argument that policy controls can compensate, partially 
or even fully, for a lack of trust in generating support for asylum and refugee policies. They also show 
that, in some cases, distrusting people can prefer policies that utilize policy controls to policies that 
provide no protection or assistance. For example, with regard to family reunification, distrusting people 
are more likely to support the conditional policy (MM = 0.56) than a policy of no family reunification 
at all (MM=0.52).  
The results discussed above all relate to individuals’ trust in EU institutions which, we find, plays a 
much larger role in conditioning public asylum and refugee policy preferences than people’s trust in 
their national government institutions. Still, our results for national political trust indicate that the use 
of limits and controls can generate support among people with low trust for asylum and refugee policies 
that provide protection to refugees.  
As shown in Figure B below, people with low degrees of trust in their national government 
institutions show significantly greater support for asylum and refugee policies that provide 
protection/assistance to refugees if these policies include limits and/or conditions. For example, low 
trusting respondents prefer policies that include conditional rather than unconditional family 
reunification policies (MMs = 0.56 and 0.47, respectively), conditional rather than unconditional 
financial assistance to non-EU countries (MMs = 0.53 and 0.45, respectively), limited rather than 
unlimited numbers of asylum applications each year (MMs = 0.53 and 0.47, respectively), and 
restrictions on protections for failed asylum seekers. These results are consistent with our claim that 
policy controls can compensate for low political trust and generate policy support even from distrusting 
people.  
However, we do not find that it is only, or primarily, people with low trust in national political 
institutions who prefer policies that include controls. As can be seen in Figure B, most respondents, 
regardless of their degree of trust in national governmental institutions, prefer policies that include limits 
to conditions to policies that provide unlimited and unconditional protection. There is no evidence in 
our data that the presence of policy controls makes a larger difference to public support among the 
lowest trusting respondents. More broadly, in contrast to our analysis of the role of trust in EU 
institutions, we find no evidence to support the idea that individuals who are less trusting in their national 
government institutions tend to be less supportive of policies that include expansive, unlimited, and 
unconditional features, and more supportive of policies that eliminate protection/assistance in some 
policy dimensions. In other words, our results on trust in national government institutions do not support 
the theoretical expectations based on Hetherington (2005).  
  
                                                     
10 There is one exception to this statement: In the ‘governance’ dimension, the experimental design does not allow for a 
possible policy condition or limit. 
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Note: Values of national government trust 1-6 indicate answer options “Entirely trusting” (1, bottom of the stacked bars), 
“Somewhat trusting”, “A little bit trusting”, “A little bit distrusting”, “Somewhat distrusting”, and “Entirely distrusting (6, 
top of the stacked bars)” Results from separate estimations per sub-group. 
Robustness Checks 
We conduct a series of checks to verify our results. We investigated whether our result on the conditional 
role of EU trust is merely an artefact, and instead might mask the influence of another individual-level 
characteristic that is correlated with EU trust. To investigate this possibility, we conducted a battery of 
robustness checks in which we interact different variables with the six policy dimensions. The results 
can be found in Appendix 3. Comparing different model specifications with the help of a nested model 
comparison test suggests that interactions between policy features and individual characteristics improve 
further the fit of the model and can affect some of the interactions between policy features and 
individuals’ trust in EU institutions. The estimates of the interaction between EU trust remain significant 
and of the same direction but they are almost all smaller in magnitude when introducing simultaneous 
interactions with immigration attitude. Adding interactions between policy features and age groups as 
well as interactions between policy features and the respondent’s education level hardly makes a 
difference for any of the estimates. Finally, we add interactions with political ideology (scale of liberal 
to conservative). Doing so does not substantively change the results, although for the estimates of two 
policy features (high resettlement; and family reunification conditional on cost of living) the significance 
of the interaction estimate is eroded above the p<0.05 threshold.  
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Conjoint tasks are cognitively demanding and therefore require respondents to devote a certain 
degree of concentration. To be sure that participants were able to focus sufficiently on the conjoint tasks, 
we required them to complete the survey only on a computer and not allowed to complete it on a mobile 
device. We also took measures to reduce bias from potential survey fatigue. We restricted the number 
of tasks to five per individual, which is well within the number of tasks that a respondent can complete 
before fatigue reduces response quality (Bansak et al. 2018). In addition, we analysed whether estimated 
preferences depend on the number of conjoint tasks that have already been completed, to ensure that 
any remaining form of fatigue does not affect our results strongly. As is shown in Appendix 8, there are 
no statistically significant differences in the estimates across the number of conjoint tasks.  
The results have to be interpreted in light of our choice to apply equal weights for each country due 
to the similar sample size in each of the countries included in our survey. The estimates for the 
preferences of an average individual across the eight countries, we reweight the results using the size of 
the represented population in each country (see Appendix 4).11  
Discussion and Conclusion  
This article provides the first experimental evidence about the relationship between political trust and 
policy preferences and a novel analysis of how this relationship is contingent on the design of policies. 
To assess this question empirically, we conducted an original cross-national conjoint experiment to 
examine how a person’s trust in political institutions conditions his or her preferences for asylum and 
refugee policy. Randomizing the policy features, we demonstrate that individuals with lower levels of 
EU trust are more supportive of policies that provide protection and assistance to refugees if these 
policies utilize controls such as limits or conditions. Moreover, we find that that there is less divergence 
between low and high trusting individuals when policies feature instruments of control such as limits 
and conditions. We have argued that this is the case because policies that feature policy controls can 
function as safeguards against uncertainty, which allow for distrusting individuals to nonetheless form 
supportive policy preferences.  
Our finding that trust in EU institutions plays a much more significant role in conditioning public 
preferences for asylum and refugee policy than trust in national government institutions does not come 
as a surprise. Public debates on asylum and refugees in Europe have become highly Europeanised in 
recent years, in the sense that the regulation of asylum and refugee issues in Europe is perceived to be a 
European issue as much as (or even more so than) a national issue. Data from Eurobarometer suggest 
that immigration is highly salient at the European level, but much less so at the national level (European 
Commission 2019).12 Furthermore, over the past few years, the European Council, the European 
Commission, and individual EU Member States have made a considerable number of policy proposals 
on how to reform Europe’s asylum and refugee policies following the large inflows of asylum seekers 
and other migrants in 2015-16 (Geddes and Ruhs 2018). These proposals have led not only to extensive 
political debates across the EU but also to considerable media coverage of these issues in EU Member 
States, which is likely to have strengthened Europeans’ perception of asylum and refugee issues as 
European policy questions.  
Beyond the specific analysis of public support for asylum and refugee policies, our results also have 
important implications for the role of political trust in the formation of policy preferences more 
generally. The finding that politically distrusting individuals are less supportive of asylum and refugee 
policies that provide expansive and unlimited protections and rights are in line with the established 
theory and argument put forward by Hetherington (2005). Yet our research also refines this argument 
                                                     
11 Results available upon request.  
12 For example, in 2019 the share of Europeans who mentioned immigration when asked to identify the two most important 
issues facing the EU and their own countries were 35 percent and 17 percent, respectively 
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and common understanding by demonstrating how even distrusting individuals can generate support for 
policies that are not directly beneficial to them if certain policy controls are in place. In fact, we find 
that individuals who lack trust in European institutions are most attracted to this alternative and more 
conditional way of providing protections to asylum seekers and refugees. Our results imply that certain 
policy controls, such as limits or well-defined conditions, have a compensatory effect in the sense that 
they act as safeguards that can counter-act and in some cases completely offset an individual’s lack of 
political trust in his or her preference formation.  
Future research is needed to refine these results. There is still much to be understood about various 
aspects of how policy controls, such as limits and conditions, can offset a person’s distrust in political 
institutions in the formation of policy preferences. For instance, how strong must policy controls be to 
compensate fully for a person’s lack of trust in political institutions? What exactly makes a policy control 
‘weak’ or ‘strong’ in this context? Our experimental design tests the impact of the basic principle of 
using limits and conditions in asylum and refugee policy but not the required strength of the controls 
and conditions. These questions – to what extent and how policy controls can compensate for a lack of 
political trust in the formation of policy preferences – can and should also be analysed in the context of 
other public policy areas where political trust would be expected to be consequential, such as minority 
rights or the provision of international development aid. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Introductory pages of experiment: Definitions and Instructions 
We would like to get your thoughts on policies towards asylum seekers and refugees in Europe. There are no right 




Important definitions:  
 
In the survey, we use the terms “asylum seekers”, “refugees”, and “resettlement.” It is important to be clear about 
the different meanings of these terms.  
 
An “asylum-seeker” is someone who enters your country to ask for protection, but whose application for protection 
has not yet been decided by your government. If their application is unsuccessful, the person is considered a 
“refused asylum-seeker.”  
 
 If an asylum-seeker’s application for protection is successful, he or she is given the formal status of a “refugee.” 
This means that refugees are people in need of protection whose formal status as a refugee has already been 
recognized.  
 
“Resettlement”: Instead of people coming to [YOUR COUNTRY] to apply for asylum, the process of resettlement 
involves the transfer of people who are already recognized refugees, from a non-EU country that hosts large 
numbers of refugees (e.g. in refugee camps) directly to [your country]. In contrast to the asylum process, where 
your government considers and decides on whether the application for protection is successful, under resettlement 




What we are asking you to do:  
 
Imagine that the [country] government is proposing different policy options for dealing with asylum seekers and 
refugees. We will now provide you with information about the different policy options, each of which is made up 
of six components. We will always ask you to compare two policy options and make a choice between them. 
Please note that the policy options that you are presented with may differ in some, but not necessarily all 
components. Of the two policy options presented to you, please always choose the one that you would personally 
prefer to be implemented in [country]. In total, we will show you five comparison pairs of policy options. Please 
take your time when reading the descriptions of each policy option.  
 
Please consider each choice carefully as though they are real choices. Think carefully about the advantages and 
disadvantages of each option. How would you feel if the policy option you chose were implemented by the 
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Appendix 2: Definitions of control variables 
 
 
National government trust: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust national government institutions“. Answer 
scale: Entirely trusting, Somewhat trusting, A little bit trusting, Somewhat distrusting, Entirely distrusting. This 
item is included in Appendix 3 as a linear variable. 
EU trust: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. Please tell 
me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust European Union institutions”. Answer scale: Entirely trusting, 
Somewhat trusting, A little bit trusting, Somewhat distrusting, Entirely distrusting. This item is included in 
Appendix 3 as a linear variable.  
Attitude towards migration: “Do you think the number of immigrants in [YOUR COUNTRY] nowadays should 
be:” Answer scale: Increased a lot, Increased a little, Kept the same, Decreased a little, Decreased a lot. This 
item is included in Appendix 3 as a linear variable. 
Age: “How old are you?” Answer scale: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-70. This variable is always included as a 
factor, i.e. separate dummy variables for each level.  
High skill: “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?” This is included as a dummy. No 
formal education, Incomplete primary school, Complete primary school, Incomplete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type, Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, Incomplete secondary: 
university-preparatory type, Complete secondary: university-preparatory type, Some university-level education, 
without degree, University-level education, with degree. In the models in Appendix 3 we include a dummy 
variable taking the value one for the latter two levels 
Liberalism: “Which of the following comes closest to describing your political views?” Answer scale: Very 
conservative, Moderately conservative, Neutral/centrist, Moderately progressive/liberal, Very progressive/ 
liberal, None of the above, Don’t know/Not sure. To reduce the number of different levels, we aggregate these 
values in the following four groups: Conservative, Neutral/Centrist, Progressive/liberal, None/Don't 
know/Unsure. These are then included as a factor, i.e. separate dummy variables for each level.  
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Appendix 3 
Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of Asylum and Refugee Policy Features Interacted with 
Individual Characteristics 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Asylum Applications: Baseline = No Limits      
Asylum Applications: Annual Limits 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.03 **  0.04 *** 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Resettlement: Baseline = No Resettlement      
Resettlement: High resettlement -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 **  -0.07 *** 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Resettlement: Low resettlement  0.00   0.00   0.01   0.00   -0.02   
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Return to Harm: Baseline = Never      
 Return to Harm: In Some Cases -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.00   
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Family Reunification: Baseline = Always possible      
Family Reunification: Cost of Living 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 *** 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Family Reunification: Never Possible -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 *** 0.02   
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Decision making: Baseline = National      
Decision making: EU -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.08 *** 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Financial Assistance Baseline = None      
Financial Assistance: Conditional 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01   
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Financial Assistance: Unconditional -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 **  -0.05 *** 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
 
Interactions with EU trust 
Asylum limits      0.03 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 **  
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
High resettlement      -0.04 *** -0.01 **  -0.01 **  -0.01   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
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Low resettlement      -0.03 *** -0.01 **  -0.01 *  -0.01 *  
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Return to harm      0.05 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Reunification: Cost of living      0.03 *** 0.01 *  0.01 *  0.00   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Family: Never possible      0.07 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 *** 
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
EU decision      -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Conditional financial solidarity      -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.01 *** 
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Unconditional Solidarity      -0.04 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *  
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
 
Interactions with national government trust 
Asylum limits      -0.01 **  -0.01 *  -0.01 *  -0.01   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
High resettlement      0.01 **  0.01   0.01   0.00   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Low resettlement      0.01 **  0.01 *  0.01 *  0.01   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Return to harm      -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *  
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Reunification: Cost of living      -0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Family: Never possible      -0.01 *  -0.00   -0.00   0.00   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
EU decision      0.02 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Conditional financial solidarity      -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   
      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Unconditional Solidarity      0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   
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      (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
      
Interactions with immigration attitude no     no     yes yes yes 
Interaction with age and skill level no     no     no yes yes 
Interactions with liberalism scale no     no     no     no     yes 
N 128210     128210     128210     128210     128210     
R2 0.02   0.03   0.05   0.05   0.05   
Notes: *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Standard errors cluster at the individual level. 
Estimates are average marginal component effects (AMCEs). Results are weighted with individual-level weights to provide national 
representativeness. All participating countries are equally weighted. See Appendix 2 for how covariates are measured. 
 











Notes: Adult population on January 1, 2018 from Eurostat. 
Partly estimates. 
 
Appendix 5: Sample conjoint task (from the German language version) 
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Appendix 6: Overall effects of policy features on the probability of accepting an asylum 
and refugee policy, not disaggregated by political trust 
 
 
Note: The effects of the policy features on the probability of accepting the asylum and refugee policy. Dots indicate point 
estimates with 95% confidence intervals from linear (weighted) least squares regression. Those on the zero line without 
confidence intervals denote the reference category for each policy dimension.  
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Notes: Reporting results from an interaction model that estimates AMCEs relative to the respective baseline category and 
interacts each value with the task number, i.e. whether this was the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth conjoint task for an 
individual. Specification otherwise as in the rest of the paper. Insignificant interaction terms indicate that the overall effect of 
a policy feature does not change significantly with the number of conjoint tasks the respondent has conducted. 
 
 
